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Stuart: Mean, Stupid Defendants Jarring Our Constitutional Sensibilities:

NoTE
MEAN, STUPID DEFENDANTS JARRING OUR CONSTITUTIONAL
SENSIBILITIES: DUE PROCESS LIMITS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AFTER TXO PRODUCTION V. ALLIANCE RESOURCES
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English
love of liberty regulated by law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible
instrument of government, discourage private reprisals, restrains the
strong, influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the right of the weak, and
encourages recourse to and confidence in the courts of law by those
wronged or oppressed by acts or practices not cognizable in or not
sufficiently punished by the criminal law. 1
The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and

an unhealthy
excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of the
2
law.
INTRODUCTION

On June 25, 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a "monstrous" 3 $10
million punitive damages claim against a defendant who had caused only
$19,000 in actual damages. 4 In a patchwork plurality opinion, the Court
held that even though punitive damages were 526 times actual damages, no
violation of TXO's constitutional due process rights had occurred. 5 The
defendant, the Court reasoned, had received the process it was due in the
form of a jury trial and appellate review in the plaintiff's home state of West
Virginia.6 The punitive award, though "certainly large," 7 was neither a
result of bias nor passion on the part of the jury, but was a proper reflection
of the "magnitude of the potential harm that the defendant's conduct would
have caused."I The Court held that the tremendous damages the defendant
could have caused, had its scheme of fraud and trickery succeeded, justified
the $10 million verdict. 9

1. Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 19-20 (Wis. 1914).
2. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (1991) (quoting Fay v. Parker,
53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
3. Id. at 52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
4. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2724 (1993).
5. Id. at 2718.
6. Id. at 2727 (Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring in the judgment).
7. Id. at 2722.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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The 7XO decision flies directly in the face of a 1992 Supreme Court
decision, Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haslip0 , which appeared to hold
that punitive damages awards of more than roughly four or five times actual
damages would deserve thorough due process scrutiny. The Haslip ruling
was the first decision to articulate a due process limit on punitive damages
that are grossly disproportionate to actual damages. 1 While declining to
provide a "mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable
and the constitutionally unacceptable,"' 2 the Court expressed deep concern
over punitive damages that "run wild."' 3 However, because the Alabama
trial court provided thorough jury instructions on the issue of punitive
damages,' 4 and because the Alabama Supreme Court's appellate review
established firm standards by which to test punitive damages awards for
fairness,' 5 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to upset the state court's
decision. 16
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's opinion in TXO has left the morass
that was the controversial punitive damages issue even more obscure. By
leaning toward a more strict judicial review in Haslip, the Court finally
seemed to begin articulating the long-awaited due process limitations on
punitive damages. Yet, in TXO, the very next case involving due process
review of punitive damages, the Court not only failed to continue to develop
the standards of due process review of punitive damages awards, but
surprised many by retreating to a vague "reasonableness" standard reminiscent of its pre-Hasliplaissezfaire standard of review.
Part I of this Note is a brief review of the voluminous commentary on
the social, moral, and economic justifications for imposing constitutional
limits on punitive damages. Part II reviews the history of punitive damages,
highlighting the recent impulse to define constitutional limits on excessive
and egregious awards. Additionally, this section analyzes PacificMutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Haslip,7 in which the Court first articulated the standard of

review for violations of due process claims regarding punitive damages. Part
III examines TXO Productionv. Alliance Resources, 8 in which the Court in
that case altered the Haslip standards. Part IV is a discussion of TXO's
effect on the Haslip substantive due process standard. Part V examines the
clarifications TXO has made to the procedural due process requirements laid
out in Haslip. Part VI discusses the problems of interpreting the scattered
plurality opinion in TXO. Part VII explains the difficulty lower courts will
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1 (1991).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.at 19-20.
Id.at 21.
113 S. Ct. at 2724.
499 U.S. 1 (1991).
113 S. Ct. at 2711.
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have in applying the reasonableness test. Part VIII proposes some improvements to the TXO decision. This Note concludes that TXO has eroded the
fragile beginnings of a healthy reform of the much maligned area of punitive
damages.
I. SOCIAL AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PuNITIvE DAMAGES
Punitive damages are "extracompensatory [awards] . . . intended to
punish or deter extreme departures from acceptable conduct." 9 Jurors
commonly award punitive damages to extract a toll from defendants who
purposely or negligently misbehave.' ° These awards are often legally and
morally justified by two distinct rationales; retributivist "just deserts," and
consequentialist deterrence.21
The retributivist rationale for punitive damages appeals to our desire for
retaliation.' The purpose of this retributivist rationale is to punish wrongdoers in order to re-establish the "moral order" disturbed by their misdeeds.' While society requires merely negligent tortfeasors only to repair
the injured party, malicious or intentional tortfeasors excite our collective
ire.'
These defendants deserve something more harsh than mandatory
reparations, because what these defendants do is morally repugnant.'
Hence, separate punitive awards are necessary to re-establish the "moral
equilibrium. "I
Another sense in which punitive damages are appealing is more
systematic. Punitive damages, if imposed at sufficient levels, will tend to
deter future misbehavior by providing an economic disincentive for any such
conduct.27 This justification addresses the "bean counter"' problem, in
which a company will build a product it knows will cause a certain rate of
injury if making safer products is more expensive than simply paying for the
damages the product causes.29 These companies, in calculating the
19. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 452 (2d ed. 1993).
20. E.g., David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 So. CAL. L. REV.
103, 109-12 (1987); See also, David G. Owen, Deterrenceand Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73
CAL. L. REv. 665, 667-70 [hereinafter Deterrence].
21. For an excellent general discussion of the moral justifications of punitive damages, see

David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705, 705
(1989) [hereinafter Foundations].
22. Id. at 109-12.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 110-111.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Deterrence, supra note 20, at 670.
28. E.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (assessing a corporation
punitive damages for deaths caused by its failure to use safer equipment in attempt to lower the
price of an automobile).
29. See generally David G. Owen, CrashworthinessLitigation and Punitive Damages, 4 J.
PROD. LIAB. 221 (1981).
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profitability of adding various features affecting safety, weigh the cost of
installing safer features against the overall cost of dealing with the subsequent
injury and wrongful death lawsuits." In a legal system without punitive
damages, a corporation may have little economic incentive to make the
product as safe as is economically feasible because damages in actual lawsuits
will be small in comparison to profits. Yet, when a jurisdiction imposes
punitive damages, the company is forced to give greater weight to the
potential costs of injury. If the product is dangerous, and could potentially
cause significant injury, then the company will either take extra precautionary
measures, or will not make the product at all.
Insofar as punitive damages serve to force defendants to give greater
weight to the extrinsic costs of human suffering and death, punitive damages
make products safer. However, imposing excessive punitive damages can
have serious repercussions. If the courts impose punitive damages in excess
of what is necessary to protect the social interest at stake, defendants are

punished for engaging in risky, but potentially beneficial production." When
punitive damages increase beyond what is necessary, defendants will either
pass these costs along to consumers, or simply stop doing business in the

industry."
In either case, society as a whole will suffer. 36 The
"retributivist" justification for punitive damages, too, must not be unlimited.
Meting out arbitrary or egregiously excessive punishment is itself morally
repugnant, 7 and is proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 8
Confines on punishment appeal to our intuitive sense of fairness, which tells
us that punishment should be proportionate to the nature of the wrong.
Thus, civil punishment has sound moral and historical foundations, but only
when administered fairly. 9

30. Id.

31. Id.
32. See Deterrence, supra note 20, at 670.
33. Id. at 671.

34. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1257, 1262 (1976).
35. Id.
36. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282

(1989)

(O'Connor, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY:
THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 152-71 (1988).

37. Foundations,supra note 21, at 723.
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, XIV.
39. Foundations,supra note 21, at 739.
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II. PuNmvE DAMAGES PRIOR To TXO: HASLIP AND ITS PREDECESSORS
A. The Punitive Damages Debate
As early as the 18th Century, American courts recognized the usefulness
of punitive damages to punish or deter malicious conduct.' The legal debate
over the proper limitations on punitive damages has perplexed American
courts for over a century.4 1
The quandary of Constitutional limits on
excessive punitive damages awards, too, has been long-lingering on the
Supreme Court's conscience.' The Court first established a standard for due
process review of punitive damages in 1908, holding that excessive fines
"amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law." 43 As
early as 1915, the Court struck down a punitive damages award that it
regarded as violative of the Due Process Clause.' More recently, commentators have decried the growing number and size of punitive damages awards,
and have appealed for stronger judicial constraints.4' In the late seventies,
punitive damages claims of $250,000 were considered exceptionally large."
By the mid-eighties, punitive damages claims as large as $7 million were
common.47 The upward trend continues, with a recent claim topping $1
billion in punitive damages alone.' State legislatures have responded to the
perceived crisis by enacting statutes limiting the amount juries may award in

40. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791).
41. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1872) (characterizing punitive damages as a "monstrous
heresy"); Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18 (Wis. 1914) (characterizing punitive damages as an
"outgrowth of the English love of liberty").
42. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 76-77 (1907); St. Louis I.M.&
S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S.
270, 281 (1912).
43. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1908) (citing Coffey v.
Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659 (1907)).
44. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915) (holding punitive
damages award was "arbitrary and oppressive").
45. See generally Daniel B. Dobbs, Ending Punishmentin "Punitive"Damages:DeterrenceMeasured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REv. 831 (1989); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damagesfor
Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989); Stephen D. Daniels &

Joanne M. Martin, Myth andReality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990); Anthony
F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual PunishmentsInflicted: The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L.
R v. 839 (1969); PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988).
46. See David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REv. 1257, 1329-1332 (1976).
47. See Ford Motor Co. v. Durrill, 714 S.W.2d 329, 347 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) ($10
million); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319 S.E. 2d 470, 481 (Ca. Ct. App. 1984) ($8
million); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 221 (Colo. 1984) ($6.2 million).
48. Thomas W. Ladd, Haslip and Beyond: The Future of Punitive Damages, FOR THE DEF.,
May 1991, at 3.
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punitive damages.49 By far, the most common way of calculating a restraint
on punitive damages is limiting them to some proportion of actual damages.5" The U.S. Supreme Court has recently reflected a concern over
"skyrocketing" punitive damages awards,5 and has recently given serious
consideration to enunciating Constitutional limits.52
The most successful challenges to punitive damages have arisen under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Challenges have
focused both on substantive54 as well as procedural55 due process. In the
1988 case, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,56 the petitioner
presented the Court with a due process argument for limiting punitive
damages in the case, but the majority declined to address the issue because
the petitioner did not raise the issue below.
However, in her dissent,
Justice O'Connor hinted that, given the proper procedural posture, a due

49. At least 18 states impose some statutory limitation on punitive damages awards,
including Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Florida, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
and West Virginia. Brief for Petitioner, app. C, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
50. Proportional limitations generally affix punitive damages as a multiple of compensatory
damages; normally two or three times compensatory damages. Of the 18 states that have
enacted statutes limiting punitive damages, all use some form of proportional limitation such as
double or treble actual damages. Fewer states utilize absolute monetary caps, while others
create combinations of absolute and proportional limitations. Id.
51. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 10 (1991) (quoting Browning-Ferris
Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
52. The Court has examined several theories purporting to find Constitutional limits on
punitive damages, Browning-Ferris Indust. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)
(Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989) (Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (Equal Protection and Contract Clauses).
53. Due Process challenges to penalties date back to the early 20th Century. Waters-Pierce
Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); Seaboard Air Line Ry Co. v. Seegers, 207 J.S. 73
(1907); St. Louis I M & S R Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1912). Recent challenges include
Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435 (1989); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
54. The concept of substantive due process, in its classical form, has been defined thusly:
In "every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this character is
concerned, and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the question
necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the
state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the
individual to his personal liberty?" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
55. The concept of procedural due process has been defined thusly: "The element of due
process analysis characterized as "procedural due process" delineates the constitutional limits
on judicial, executive, and administrative enforcement of legislative or other governmental
dictates or decisions." LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
TIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 664 (2d ed. 1988).

RALPH

S.

TYLER, JR., AMERICAN CONSTITU-

56. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
57. Id. at 78-79.
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process claim may arise from an excessive punitive damages claim.5 8 The
very next year the Court heard Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco
Disposal,5 9 another case invoking due process limitations on punitive
damages.'
Again, the Court declined to address the issue for lack of
consideration below. However, all nine justices did express a willingness to
consider a Due Process challenge:
Petitioners also ask us to review the punitive damages award to determine
whether it is excessive under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The parties agree that due process imposes some limits on
jury awards of punitive damages, and it is not disputed that a jury award
may not be upheld if it was the product of bias or passion, or if it was
reached in proceedings lacking the basic elements of fundamental fairness
.... There is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due
Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages
award ...

but we have never addressed the precise question presented

here: whether due process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to
award punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory lim...I
it.

Given the right case, the Court seemed ready to articulate a due process
limitation.
B. Toward Articulation
The Supreme Court's chance to apply due process limits to punitive
damages came during the winter term of 1990, when Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company appealed an unfavorable punitive damages award from
an Alabama state court.6' The plaintiffs in that case, Cleopatra Haslip and
her fellow employees of Roosevelt City, Alabama, sued Pacific Mutual when
they discovered the health insurance policy they thought they had purchased
from Pacific Mutual did not exist.' Pacific Mutual's agent fraudulently
misappropriated premiums paid by Roosevelt City, and Pacific Mutual,
thinking the premiums delinquent, canceled the city's policy.'
Soon
thereafter, Haslip was hospitalized and incurred significant medical bills.65
Pacific Mutual refused to remit payment, and the Hospital sought payment

58. Id. at 87 ("Appellant has touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy of the
Court's attention in an appropriate case....

In my view, because of the punitive character of

such awards, there is reason to think that this may violate the Due Process Clause."). Id.
59. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
60. Id. at 276-77.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 1.
63. Id. at 4-5.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id.
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from Haslip, eventually turning the account over to a collection agency.6
Haslip and several other employees brought suit against Pacific Mutual,
seeking compensatory damages of $200,000, and punitive damages of $3
million.67

The judge gave the jury detailed instructions describing the

purpose of punitive damages, 6 and the jury was not allowed to hear evidence

of Pacific Mutual's wealth. 69 The jury awarded Haslip $1,040,000, at least

$840,000 of which was a punitive damages award.7"
Alabama law,

1

In accordance with

the trial court conducted a post-trial hearing of the damage

award to Haslip, finding sufficient grounds for a jury finding of "malicious,
gross, or oppressive fraud. "I

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the punitive award.
The Alabama Supreme Court undertook a two-step, post-verdict review

analyzing the award first from a comparative standard.73 The state supreme
court applied its own substantive "Hornsby" standards to determine whether
the award exceeded the minimum amount necessary to accomplish the state's
goals of deterring and punishing fraud.74 After this thorough scrutiny, the
Alabama Supreme Court found that the trial court properly conducted it's
post-trial review, and found the amount of the award was reasonable given
the express punitive and deterrence objectives stated in Hornsby.'
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6 n.2.
68. Jury members were told that punitive damages were 'not to compensate the plaintiff for
any injury," but "to punish the defendant" and "for the added purpose of protecting the public
by [deterring] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future." Id. at 6 n. 1.

69. Id. at 6.
70. Id. at 6 n.2.
71. See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374 (Ala. 1986). Alabama requires the
trial court to conduct a "Hammond" hearing to determine independently whether damages are
excessive. Hammond requires the trial court to consider the "culpability of the defendant's
conduct," the "desirability of discouraging others from similar conduct," the "impact upon the
parties," and "other factors, such as the impact on innocent third parties." Haslip, 499 U.S. at
20 (explaining Hammond).
72. 499 U.S. at 23.
73. Id. at 21. Alabama's first step of review is defined in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
505 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Ala. 1987).
74. Alabama's second step of review is defined in Green Oil Co. v. Homsby, 539 So. 2d
218, 222 (Ala. 1989); Wilson v. Dukona Corp., 547 So. 2d 70, 73 (Ala. 1989); Central Ala.
Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 377-378 (Ala. 1989). The Hornsby test considers
whether a punitive award promotes the state's goals of deterrence and retribution of offenders.
The Court cited with approval several factors in these cases that may be taken into account in
determining whether an award is excessive: "(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct
as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defendant's awareness, any concealment,
and the existence and recency of similar past conduct; (c) the profitability to the defendant of
the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and of having the defendant
also sustain a loss; (d) the 'financial position' of the defendant; (e) all the costs of litigation; (f)
the imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in
mitigation; and (g) the existence of other civil awards against the defendant for the same
conduct, these also to be taken in mitigation." Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22.
75. 499 U.S. at 23.
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When the case reached the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, was well-pleased by the thorough review given by the
Alabama judicial system. The Court focused its due process analysis both
on procedural and substantive aspects of the Alabama court system's
procedure, and found it adequate.76 The Court focused on three aspects of
Alabama's process. First, the jury instructions given by the trial court were
adequate because they constrained the jury's discretion to deterrence and
retribution.77 Second, the appellate court's review, which proscribed
imposition of damages that "exceed an amount that will accomplish society's
goals of punishment and deterrence,"' 8 and provided a "sufficiently definite
and meaningful constraint" on the jury in awarding punitive damages.79

Third, the Court also reviewed the substantive due process issue of whether
the amount of damages itself was a violation of the petitioner's substantive
due process.8' Justice Blackmun opined that even though punitive damages
of over four times the amount of compensatory damages, and over 200 times
Haslip's out-of-pocket expenses, were "close to the line,"" the post-verdict
review provided sufficient review of "objective criteria"' so that the
Alabama's judicial process was, overall, not a violation of Pacific Mutual's
right to due process. 3
In Haslip, the Court reviewed both the state court's reviewing procedure,
including jury instructions and trial court review, as well as the substantive
issue of whether the actual amount of the award was so large as to be a
violation of substantive due process.' The procedural due process test for
review was whether the state court, through jury instructions and post-verdict
review, imposes "sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the
discretion of ... fact finders in awarding punitive damages. "I

In addition,

on review, the Court required the state's appellate court to ensure "that
punitive damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the offense and have some understandable relationship to compensatory

76. Id.at 21-24.
77. Id. at 19-20. In Alabama, pre-verdict constraint consists of jury instructions that describe
the purpose of punitive damages as to protect the public and to punish and deter the defendant.
The court admonished the jury to consider the character and degree of wrong shown and
necessity of preventing similar wrong in setting the amount of punitive damages. The court
reminded the jury that punitive damages are not mandatory, and the jury did not hear evidence
of defendant's wealth. Id.
78. Id. at 21.
79. Id. at 22.
80. Id.at 23.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.at 20-22.
85. Id.at 22.
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damages."86 so that the punitive damages claim does not "upset one's
Constitutional sensibilities. "I

Haslip, the long-awaited opinion on the limits of punitive damages,
appeared to establish a rather strict test for lower courts as to whether the
state procedures established "definite and meaningful constraints on the
jury." As an example of such a review, Haslip endorsed the Alabama
judicial review system, which required state courts to afford defendants
procedural due process by providing (1) reasonable constraints on the fact
finder's discretion (2) a meaningful and adequate post-verdict review of the
punitive award by the trial court, and (3) a meaningful and adequate review
by a state appellate court."8
I. TXO v. ALLmNCE
In Haslip, the Court seemed to have found the theoretical basis for the
beginnings of constitutional limits on punitive damages. However, in the
very next case concerning due process limits on punitive damages, the Court
reversed its apparent direction in TXO Production v. Alliance Resources.
A. The Case In West Virginia
In 1984, geologists employed by TXO Production, a subsidiary of US
Steel's Oil and Gas division, were searching for large oil and gas deposits in
the West Virginian Appalachian Mountains.89 TXO's geologists called the
corporation's attention to an unutilized, thousand-acre tract of land known as
the "Blevins Tract" owned by Tug Fork Land Company, and leased to
respondent Alliance Resources. After some initial bargaining, TXO
approached Alliance with what Alliance considered a "phenomenal offer. "I
TXO agreed to give Alliance $20 per acre in cash, 22 percent of the oil and
gas revenues, and pay all development costs in exchange for Alliance's oil
and gas rights on the Blevins Tract.9" TXO required, however, that Alliance
agree to return all consideration paid by TXO if TXO's attorney determined
that "title had failed. "I

Upon examining the title to Alliance's leasehold to the Blevins tract,
TXO's attorney discovered what they believed to be a problem with a 1958
conveyance from the then-owner of Blevins Tract, Tug Fork, to a successor-

86. Id.

87. Id. at 18.
88. Games v. Fleming Landfill, 413 S.E.2d 897, 907-08 (W. Va. 1991).
89. Brief for Respondent, at 2, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711 (1993) (No. 92-479).
90. 113 S. Ct. at 2715.

91. Id.
92. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 875.
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in-interest, Leo J. Signaigo, Jr.93 However, rather than notify Alliance of the
potential problem to allow them to clear any clouds on title, TXO contacted
Mr. Signaigo directly.94 Mr. Signaigo told TXO's agent that the 1958
conveyance gave him coal rights only, and did not convey oil and gas
rights .

Yet, rather than take Mr. Signaigo's statement as clearing possible
clouds to title, TXO sought to establish that Mr. Signaigo could not say

whether the oil and gas rights were included in the 1958 deed.96 TXO's

attorneys drew up an affidavit that did not accurately represent Mr.
Signaigo's belief about what the deed conveyed, stating that "there was no

specific agreement [between Signaigo and] Tug Fork Land Company as to
whether or not the oil and gas would be reserved by Tug Fork Land

Company." 97 Mr. Signaigo flatly refused to sign the affidavit. 98
Since Signaigo would not agree to sign the affidavit, TXO purchased a
quitclaim deed from a successor in interest to Mr. Signaigo, Virginia Crews,
for $6,000, apparently hoping either to acquire thereby some interest in the

oil and gas rights to the Blevins Tract, or simply to ensure Signaigo would
not reassert a claim at a later date. 99 However, TXO did not immediately
notify Alliance of its acquisition of the quitclaim deed. Only after recording
its quitclaim deed did TXO inform Alliance of the putative cloud on

Alliance's title."° According to Alliance, TXO's attorneys aggressively
attempted to gain concessions in Alliance's "phenomenal" royalty by
threatening to sue over the "cloud" on Alliance's title."1

93. 113 S. Ct. at 2715. The deed conveyed "all the coal and other minerals and mineral
substances in, on, and underlying" the Blevins tract. In West Virginia in 1958, "mineral
substances" commonly referred to oil and gas. A later section excepted "from the operation of
this deed: (a) All the oil and gas and all the coal in the Pocahontas No. 3 and No. 4 seams in
said three tracts of land above described." TXO felt that the exception left ambiguous whether
the grantor reserved all oil and gas underlying the Blevins Tract, or just the oil and gas
underneath "the Pocahontas No. 3 and No. 4 seams" If "all the oil and gas and all the coal"
was one phrase, modified by "inthe Pocahontas No. 3 and No. 4 seams" then the grantor only
reserved the oil and gas underneath the Pocahontas seams. However, if the phrase is treated as
two separate objects, consisting of (1) "all the oil and gas" and (2) "all the coal," then only
the second phrase, "all the coal" is modified by "in the Pocahontas" seams. In this case, the
grantor reserved all the oil and gas underneath the entire Blevins Tract. Brief for Petitioner, at
4, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (No. 92-479).
94. 113 S. Ct. at 2716.
95. 419 S.E.2d at 876.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 419 S.E.2d at 876. Clearly, Mr. Signaigo did not appreciate the intricate litanies
required by property law. He stated that he did not intend to purchase anything more than the
coal rights, and refused to agree that he may have unwittingly done so.
99. Id. at 877.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Alliance refused any concessions, and shortly thereafter TXO filed an
action for a declaratory judgment to quiet title." Alliance counterclaimed,
alleging slander of title, an ancient cause of action rarely used in modem
West Virginia courtrooms. 3 The circuit court bifurcated each party's
claims, and quickly dismissed TXO's declaratory judgment action, finding
the 1958 deed to be "clear and unambiguous."" ° Alliance claimed
$19,000 in actual damages, the amount which Alliance spent in attorney's
fees defending TXO's claim.1 5 In addition to the actual damages, the jury
awarded Alliance $10 million in punitive damages. 6
Ultimately the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found
sufficient basis for the punitive damages award.I°0 The court reasoned that
while TXO's concern over any possible clouds on Alliance's title was
well-warranted given the huge investment TXO was about to undertake,
TXO's handling of the problem demonstrated nefarious motives. 102 The
court noted that if TXO's motive was purely to clear up any clouds on the
title, it could have easily done so by naming Tug Fork as assignee of the
quitclaim deed TXO purchased, or by simply requesting that Alliance clear
up any problems itself. 9 Moreover, haling Alliance into court on the quiet
title action, the court reasoned, revealed TXO's true intent to use the
nuisance value of the lawsuit as a bargaining chip in an effort to reduce the
"phenomenal" royalties it was obligated to pay Alliance.110
TXO claimed that the punitive damages award should be set aside as a
violation of West Virginia's due process requirements as set forth in Games
v. Fleming Landfill."' In examining Games, the Supreme Court of Appeals
laid out West Virginia's procedural due process requirements in imposing
punitive damages.112 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found the
1958 deed to convey unambiguously the coal rights only to Signaigo." 3
However, rather than simply apply the facts in TXO's case to the Games
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2714.
107. 419 S.E.2d at 877.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 880.
111. 413 S.E.2d 897 (V. Va. 1991).
112. Id. at 887. The court lays out nine factors the court should instruct the jury to consider:
(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm likely to occur from the
defendant's conduct as well as to the actual harm, (2) the reprehensibility of the conduct, (3) any
profit the defendant gained should be removed, (4) punitive damages should bear a reasonable
relationship to compensatory damages, (5) the "financial position" of the defendant (6) the costs
of litigation, (7) any criminal sanctions imposed on the defendant, (8) any other civil actions
against the same defendant, based on the same conduct, and (9) the appropriateness of punitive
damages to encourage settlements when the defendant is obviously wrong. Id.
113. Id.
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requirements, the West Virginia court embarked on an unusual characterization of the Games criteria:
Generally, the cases fall into three categories: (1) really stupid
defendants; (2) really mean defendants; and, (3) really stupid defendants
who could have caused a great deal of harm by their actions but who
actually caused minimal harm. By really stupid defendants, we signify
those defendants who have not harmed victims intentionally, but have
harmed them as a result of extreme carelessness. . . . By really mean
defendants, we signify those defendants who intentionally commit acts they
know to be harmful ... 114
The court described how lower courts should assess punitive damages within
each respective category.
In cases in which the defendant falls into the really stupid category,
and compensatory damages are neither negligible nor very large . . . we
hold that the outer limit of punitive damages is roughly five to one ....
When the defendant is not just stupid, but really mean, punitive damages
limits115must be greater in order to deter future evil acts by the defendant.
The court held:
[I]n cases where the defendant has intentionally committed mean-spirited
and harmful acts . . . even punitive damages of 500 times greater than
damages are not per se unconstitutional under Haslip and
compensatory
116
Games.

Games required the court to examine whether the punitive damages bear
a "reasonable relationship" to the harm caused.117 Ultimately, the state
court held in TXO that the high punitive damages award did bear a "reasonable relationship" to the harm caused, but that "harm caused" included not
only the actualdamages, but must also include thepotential harm that TXO's
actions could have caused. 18 The court reasoned that since TXO could have
cost Alliance millions of dollars in damages, and their conduct was "highly
reprehensible," the high punitive damages award was necessary to both

114. Id. at 888.
115. Id. at 889.
116. Id. The court placed TXO into the later category; that of "really mean" defendants who
ought to be punished very severely to deter future evil acts. However, it is difficult to see how
the court's distinction between "really stupid" and "really mean" defendants clarifies the
analysis. Determining whether or not TXO was mean or just stupid adds nothing to the analysis
of whether this particular award violated TXO's due process rights. It would be difficult to deny
that TXO was both mean and stupid, given its aggressive pursuit of a hopeless claim. The court
made no attempt to relate its mean/stupid distinction to the elemental analysis required by

Games.

117. 413 S.E.2d at 910.

118. Id. at 889.
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punish TXO's deceit and discourage TXO from continuing its nefarious
business practices." 9
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Review
On review by the U.S. Supreme Court, TXO sought to overturn the state
court's punitive damages award for violating procedural and substantive due
process guarantees. The central issue the Court faced was whether the $10
million dollar award was so excessive as to violate TXO's due process rights.
The plurality, composed of Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Kennedy,
Thomas and Scalia held that TXO's rights were not violated- but three
separate opinions were filed.
The core of the plurality opinion, written by Justice Stevens, diminished
the importance of the "dramatic disparity" between the actual and punitive
damages awards.'1
Agreeing with the West Virginia Supreme Court's
reasoning, the Court focused on the "magnitude of the potential harm that the
defendant's conduct would have caused to its intended victim if the wrongful
plan had succeeded.''
Since TXO's misbehavior could potentially have
caused "millions of dollars in damages to other victims,""' the jury was
justified in granting such a disproportionate award. The Court reasoned that
if TXO had succeeded in coercing Mr. Signaigo into signing the affidavit, or
if the state court had granted TXO's declaratory judgment action, Alliance
would have suffered "potentially millions" in damages."
The plurality also addressed TXO's claim that the trial or appellate court
did not adequately review the punitive damages award. TXO criticized the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' "cavalier" " 4decision. 11 The
Court disagreed. Even though Justice Stevens found that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals judge "did not articulate his reasons" for
upholding the verdict, he did "[indicate] his agreement with the jury's
appraisal of the egregious character of the conduct of TXO's executives."" The Court went on to state that the court's "colorful" characterizations of "really mean" and "really stupid" defendants was not essential to
the holding in the case, and the state court did attempt to justify its holding
in more traditional terms. 2 7

119. Id.
120. 7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Brief for Petitioner at 11, TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct.
2711 (1993) (No. 92-479).
125. 419 S.E.2d at 895.
126. 113 S. Ct. at 2724.
127. Id.
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According to Justice Kennedy, due process guarantees a citizen's security
against irrational or arbitrary awards that reflect bias or passion on the part
of the jury.'12 Hence, he would focus the due process inquiry on the jury's
motives for imposing the award, which imposes on the courts a duty to
investigate the size of the award, trial record, and the relative culpability of
the defendant's actions.129 Moreover, Justice Kennedy departed with the
Stevens group's approval of the potential harm as an appropriate justification
for disproportionate awards. 130 Although ultimately agreeing with the verdict
because of TXO's malice, Justice Kennedy lent no support to the Stevens
group's reasonableness test.
Justices Scalia and Thomas, while concurring in the judgment, also
rejected the Stevens group's test. They wrote in a terse opinion that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a right to
judicial review of the substance of the process by which punitive damages are
awarded, so long as due process, defined by the two justices as "traditional
procedure," is observed. 31 These justices reasoned that since the judge
instructed the jury in West Virginia's law, and both the trial court and state
Supreme Court of Appeals reviewed the award, TXO's due process claim
fails.' 32 They denied even the Stevens group's lax reasonableness standard,
and find no "substantive due process right that punitive damages be
reasonable."' 33 So long as defendants receive their proceduraldue process
rights 34under the Constitution, they have received all of the "process that is
due." 1
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AFTER TXO:

A. The InterpretationProblem in Haslip
The Court in TXO sheds new light on the substantive due process
element of the test endorsed in Haslipregarding the stringency of the "bright
line" proportionality test. In Haslip, the Court stated that there was no
"mathematical bright line between constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable punitive awards."'135 However, elsewhere the Court
appears to contradict itself by implying that such a "mathematical bright

128. Id.
129. Id. at 2725.
130. Id. at 2730.
131. Id. at 2726.
132. Id. at 2721.
133. Id. at 2726 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy also
rejects the substantive due process inquiry, stating that the Court should "not concern itself with
dollar amounts, ratios, or the quirks of juries in specific jurisdictions." Id. at 2725 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
134. Id. at 2726.
135. 499 U.S. at 1043.
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line" might well exist. The majority reasons that while the particular level
of punitive damages in Haslip were constitutionally acceptable, punitive
damages more than four times compensatory damages "may be close to the
line."'36

The Court seemed to imply that punitive damages in excess of

some proportion, about five times, of actual damages could constitute aper
se substantive due process violation
In the period between the Court's decision in Haslip and its decision in
TXO, state courts struggled to make sense of this contradictory language.

Courts have disagreed about whether the Court intended to impose some kind
of absolute substantive due process limit on punitive damages of greater

multiples than "the line"' 37 of four or five times actual damages.' In most
cases, the state courts have construed the proportionality requirement as only
a "guideline," or simply ignored the proportionality language altogether. 39
However, in some cases lower courts have taken literally the proportionality
language in Haslip as imposing an absolute bar to punitive damages awards
greater than five times compensatory damages.'40

136. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. See Richard A. Dean, Punitive Damages: The Immediate Aftermath oflHaslip, FOR THE
DEF., May 1992, at 9; Thomas W. Ladd, Haslip and Beyond: The Future of Punitive Damages,
FOR THE DEF., May 1991, at 2; Guy 0. Komblum & William A. Cerillo, Punitive Damages
Are Alive and Well After Haslip, But Is There No Hope?, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 1993, at 29.
139. See, e.g., Hilgedick v. Koehring Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76 (Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding punitive damages almost 12 times compensatory damages); Eichenseer v. Reserve
Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1277, 1384 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding punitive damages 500 times
compensatory damages); Viking Ins. Co. v. Jester, 836 S.W.2d 371 (Ark. 1992) (upholding
punitive damages 250 times compensatory damages); Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding trial court erred by reducing punitive
damages award); Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 814 P.2d 517 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) cert. granted,
114 S. Ct. 751 (1994); Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790 (Nev. 1991) (upholding
punitive damages 12 times compensatory damages); Ira Gore v. BMW, No. 90-CV-9658
(Jefferson County Cir. Ct. Ala. June 8, 1992) (upholding punitive award 1,000 times
compensatory award); Glassocock v. Armstrong Cork Co. 946 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1991)
(upholding punitive damages 19.2 times actual damages) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1778 (1992);
MGW, Inc. v. Fredricks Dev. Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888 (Ct. App. 1992) (upholding punitive
damages 5.44 times compensatory damages); Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586
So. 2d 854, 858 (Ala. 1991); Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1991) (upholding
punitive damages 260 times compensatory damages); Associates Fin. Serv. Co. v. Barbour, 592
So. 2d 191 (Ala. 1991) (explicitly rejecting literal proportional cap of 5 times compensatory
damages); Wolf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 808 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(upholding punitive damages 5.05 times compensatory damages). See Dean, supra note 141;
Ladd, supra note 141.
140. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., 596 A.2d 687 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1991) (overturning $12.5 million punitive damages award, over 50 times
compensatory damages, on basis that if four times compensatory damages was "close to the line"
in Haslip, then 50 times was surely over the line), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137; Crookston v.
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) (stating punitive damages are not excessive only
when no greater than three times actual damages); Dunn v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 774 F.
Supp. 929 (D.V.I. 1991) (granting remititur, reducing punitive damages from $25 million to $2
million after reducing compensatory damages from $1.3 million to $500,000. The court
interpreted Haslip as frowning on punitive damages greater than four times compensatory
damages.); Games v. Fleming Landfill, 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991) (holding that where no
compensatory damages are awarded, an award of punitive damages is a violation of due
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B. Resolution of the InterpretationProblem in Haslip
TXO effectively clarified the requirements of the proportionality rule.
The three-justice Stevens group'41 explicitly rejected an absolute proportionality test, holding that a substantive due process review requires only "a
general concern of reasonableness" in the relationship of compensatory
damages to punitive damages. 42 While the Stevens group refused to require
bright-line numerology of lower courts in reviewing punitive damages, it did
require lower courts to consider the proportion as relevant to the overall
reasonableness standard. 43
The concurring opinions also eschewed such a bright-line rule. Justice
Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, rejected an absolute proportionality test
in favor of an esoteric inquiry into the motives of the jury." Justices Scalia
and Thomas, in a separate concurring opinion, rejected any right whatsoever
to substantive due process in assessment of punitive damages, and, hence,
plainly disfavored a strict proportionality rule. 45 Dissenting Justices
O'Connor, White, and Souter, while favoring a more detailed review that
may include examination of the proportion of actual to punitive damages,
also did not advance a "bright line" test."46

Hence, TXO effectively clarified Haslip's ambiguous language concerning the stringency of the proportionality rule. Three justices held that a
substantive due process violation arises only when the amount of punitive
damages are "unreasonable," and three others held that disproportionate
punitive damages, alone, can never give rise to a due process violation.
Hence, the Court in TXO rejected the many applications of Haslip by lower
courts that felt required to overturn punitive damages greater than five times
compensatory damages." 47 This conclusion is supported by the few lower
courts that have interpreted TXO, which have rejected an absolute proportional cap, although no court has had an opportunity to adjudicate the specific
issue. 14 After TXO, the concept of an absolute substantive due process limit
on disproportionate punitive damages is dead.

process). See Dean, supra note 141; Ladd, supra note 141.
141. It comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun.
142. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2720 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
143. Id. at 2720.
144. Id. at 2725. Commentators have suggested that Justice Kennedy's test supplies no less
difficult a standard than the Stevens group's reasonableness inquiry he criticizes. See Lawrence
H. Tribe, Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144 (1993).
145. Id. at 2727.
146. Id. at 2729.
147. 112 S. Ct. at 2729.
148. The Pacific Group v. First State Ins. Co., 841 F. Supp. 922, 940 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(stating after TXO, defendant's argument that punitive damages were violations of due process
were "doomed"); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that a
challenge to a punitive damages award of $450,000 on due process grounds would not be valid).
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V. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AFTER TXO

Even though TXO resolved the interpretation of the plurality problem in
Haslip, the Court failed to provide much guidance as to procedural due

process requirements. Haslip caused wide divergence among the states as to
what procedural due process required when reviewing the punitive damages
award.'49 Haslip explicitly endorsed Alabama's pre-verdict jury instructions
and post-verdict trial court review procedures, holding that trial courts must
impose "sufficiently definite and meaningful constraints on the discretion of'
the jury. Lower courts have disagreed as to how closely their procedures
must resemble the Alabama system. 0 Many lower courts overturned
verdicts after Haslip, interpreting the Supreme Court's endorsement of
Alabama's system as imposing those procedures onto other states as essential
to due process.' 5' Other courts have interpreted Haslip's endorsement of the
factors stated in Hornsby as "mere platitudes," 52 and have dispensed with
one or more of the Hornsby factors approved in Haslip.53 The plurality in
TXO seemed to be more willing to accept significant divergence from the
explicit procedural requirements of Haslip. The Court noted two salient
differences between the West Virginia trial court's jury instructions and those

149. See Charles D. Stewart & Philip G. Piggott, Punitive Damages Since PacificMut. Life
Ins. Co. V. Haslip, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOc. 693.
150. Debra C. Moss, The Punitive Thunderbolt: How Much Should Courts Curb
ExtraordinaryAwards?, ABA J., May 1993, at 88.
151. Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1991), remanded, 974 F.2d
1408 (4th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that although jury instructions comported with Haslip, Virginia's
post-verdict review did not examine the Hornsby factors, and hence was insufficient due
process); Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp, 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that jury
instructions and trial court post-verdict review were insufficient to guarantee due process);
Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991) (holding that South Carolina trial courts are
required to conduct a post-trial review to consider (1) defendant's degree of culpability, (2)
duration of the conduct, (3) defendant's awareness or concealment, (4) the existence of similar
past conduct, (5) likelihood the award will deter the defendant or others from like conduct, (6)
whether the award is reasonably related to the harm likely to result from such conduct, (7)
defendant's ability to pay, and (8) other factors noted in Haslip); Asams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d
1348 (1991) (state supreme court reversed punitive award, holding its review process was
unconstitutional because it did not require evidence of defendant's financial position, as stated
in Haslip); Medical Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc. v. Evander, 609 A.2d 353 (Md. Ct. Spec. App., 1992)
(holding trial court's failure to state on the record its reasons for not interfering with a jury's
verdict a denial of due process), cert. denied, 614 A.2d 973 (1992); Games v. Fleming Landfill,
413 S.E.2d 897 (Ala. 1991) (state supreme court holding trial court's post-verdict review not
stringent enough to comport with due process as enunciated in Haslip, and adopting Alabama's
Hornsby factors).
152. TXO, 413 S.E.2d at 906.
153. Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175
(1992) (citing Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1053, Scalia, J., concurring); General Motors Corp. v.
Saenz, 829 S.W. 2d 230 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (eschewing a Haslip due process analysis by
relying only on Texas' history of upholding punitive damages); Eichenseer v. Reserve Life Ins.
Co., 934 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1991); Las Palmas Assoc. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assoc., 1 Cal. Rptr.
2d 301 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the state's post-verdict review met due process even though
trial court was not required to state its reasons for refusing to interfere with a punitive award).
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in Alabama.5 4 First, the trial court instructed the jury to consider the wealth
of the "perpetrator" in setting the amount of damages, in order to assure that
defendants of "large means" receive enough punishment to get their
"attention."'55 The trial court also instructed the jury that in addition to the
retributive and deterrence purposes, punitive damages serve "to provide
additional compensation for the conduct to which the injured parties have
been subjected."' 56 What purpose, other than addition to retribution and
deterrence, punitive damages were to serve, the state court did not indicate.
Despite these significant departures from the instructions approved in Haslip,
the Court in 7XO declined to upset the award, noting that TXO failed to raise
the issue below. 7
On the issue of allowing the jury to consider the wealth of the defendant
in assessing the amount of punitive damages, however, the Court did express
reservations. 5s The Court agreed with the petitioner TXO that "the
emphasis on the wealth of the wrongdoer increased the risk that the award
may have been influenced by prejudice against large corporations,"' 59 but
declined to find a violation of due process because in Haslip, the Court
approved consideration of the wealth of the defendant in the post-verdict
review process.'1 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, with whom Justices
White and Souter joined as to this issue, pointed out that the context in which
Alliance disclosed TXO's wealth was drastically different from the context
approved in Haslip. Defendant's wealth was a factor approved in Haslip
only in the post-verdict stages of trial court and appellate review, with a
judge as a finder of fact, and not a jury. 6 ' Indeed, the majority in Haslip

took some solace in the idea that the jury was not allowed to consider the
wealth of the defendant in determining either liability or damages. However,
in TXO, the trial court permitted Alliance's counsel to speak to the jury at
great length about TXO's "wealth," 62 and the judge instructed the jury to
consider this evidence in assessing damages.
Justice O'Connor notes in
154. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2723-24.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2736. Justice O'Connor commented on the effect this instruction had on the
jury, claiming that "[p]laintiffs are compensated for injuries they have suffered; one cannot
speak of additional compensation unless it is linked to some additional harm. To a juror,
however, compensation is the money it awards the plaintiff; 'additional compensation,' if not
linked to a particular measure of harm, is simply additional money the jury gives to the plaintiff.
As a result, the 'additional compensation' instruction, considered together with the instruction
directing the jury's attention to TXO's massive wealth, encouraged the jury to transfer some of
TXO's impressive wealth to the smaller and more sympathetic respondents as undifferentiated
'additional compensation'-for any reason, or no reason at all." Id. at 2737.
157. Id. at 2723.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22.
161. Id. at 20-22.
162. 113 S.Ct. at 2736 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
163. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 887.
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her dissent the impressionable nature of juries and the inflammatory effect
of wealth evidence.
[J]urors are not infallible guardians of the public good. They are
ordinary citizens whose decisions can be shaped by influences impermissible in our system of justice. In fact, they are more susceptible to such
influences than judges. . . . As I read the record in this case, it seems
quite likely that the jury in fact was unduly influenced by the fact that TXO
is a very large, out-of-state corporation .... The jury repeatedly was told
of TXO's extraordinary resources.... To make matters worse, unlike the
jurors or the primary plaintiffs, TXO was not from West Virginia ...
As the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has recognized, the
temptation to transfer wealth from out-of-state corporate defendants to instate plaintiffs can be quite strong.'6

Yet, even while acknowledging the bias that wealth may have on a jury, the
Court declined to restrict this prejudicial influence and instead opened the
door to another potentially inflammatory factor that jurors may consider in
assessing punitive damages.'
Instead of the long-awaited Supreme Court
case clarifying the many due process issues left unanswered in Haslip, the
Court in TXO retreated from the significant advancements made it's only
attempt to restrain "skyrocketing"'" punitive damages.
VI. THE WANING PRECEDENTAL VALUE OF THE REASONABLENESS TEST
A. Problems in Interpretingthe Plurality

While it is clear after TXO that a punitive damages award in excess of
five times compensatory damages will not constitute a per se due process
violation, the fractured plurality leaves unanswered the question of whether
the substantive due process "reasonableness" inquiry of the Haslip due
process test will be requiredof lower courts at all. 67 In retreating from the

164. 113 S. Ct. at 2728, 2736-38 (O'Connor, I., dissenting).
165. Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J. with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment).
Justice Kennedy, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, stated his position thusly:
"Justice O'Connor makes a plausible argument, based on the record and the trial court's
instructions, that the size of the punitive award is explained by the jury's raw, redistributionist
impulses stemming from antipathy to a wealthy, out-of-state corporate defendant." Id. at 2725-26
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although Justice Kennedy
ultimately sided with the plurality because he felt TXO demonstrated malice, he expressed doubt
about whether evidence of wealth would be admissible in cases "involving vicarious liability,
negligence, or strict liability." Id. at 2726.
166. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 10 (1990) (quoting Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
167. Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Blackmun clearly held that a substantive due process
inquiry is required, while Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas clearly believe it is not. Prior
to Justice White's retirement, the swing votes would likely have come from the dissenters in
7X0, Justices O'Connor, White, and Souter. Justices O'Connor and White agreed that some
substantive due process inquiry is required, while Justice Souter, without explanation, failed to
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beginnings established in Haslip, the Court has failed to amass a majority of
Justices that support any one standard of due process review of punitive
damages. Because only four justices in the plurality favor any substantive
due process limits at all, a serious problem arises in attempting to determine
which standard of review is required of lower courts.
The problem of interpreting a plurality opinion is currently a hot
topic. 16 A plurality decision in which no justices agree as to the correct rule
of law represents only a weak precedent at best.169 One model of precedental
interpretation requires a clear majority of the plurality to establish a binding
legal precedent."7 In TXO, while six justices supported the outcome of the
case, 17 1 at most only four' 72 supported the application of the plurality rule in
substantive due process analysis. The three-justice Stevens group departed
from its earlier endorsement in Haslip of the more detailed substantive due
process inquiry,173 and instead supported a reasonableness standard for due
process review of punitive damages. None of the remaining concurring
members of the Court supported anything like a reasonableness standard, and
the dissenters' opinion, while supportive of more exigent review, is not
binding law under a "majoritarian" model. 4 Only four justices in the
plurality favored anything like the reasonableness standard, even counting a
contumacious Justice Kennedy. Hence, under a majoritarian precedental
analysis, the reasonableness test fails to establish a binding precedent at all.
Under a more inclusive "persuasive opinion" model, only the part of the
plurality that is intuitively persuasive and consistent with earlier opinions is
considered binding.175 In TXO, the three dissenting Justices, and Justice
Kennedy in concurrence, wrote in favor of a more exacting substantive due
process inquiry like that implicated in Haslip. In contrast, the plurality wrote
to significantly alter the test proposed in Haslip. It would seem, then, that
because the dissenters are more consistent with the relevant precedent,
Haslip, under the "persuasive opinion" model they may write with more

join a part of the dissent that explicitly supported such a requirement. Prior to Justice
Blackmun's retirement, only if either Justice Souter or Ginsberg are persuaded to support a
substantive due process requirement would Haslip's reasonableness inquiry become a
Constitutional requirement. With the current churning of the membership of the Court,
however, predicting the outcome of future decisions is highly speculative.

168. See Ken Kimura, A Legitimacy Modelfor the Interpretationof PluralityDecisions, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1593 (1992) [hereinafter Legitimacy]. See also Mark A. Thurmon, When the

Court Divides: Reconsidering the PrecedentalValue of Supreme Court PluralityDecisions, 42
DUKE L.J. 419 (1992).
169. Legitimacy, supra note 168, at 1594-1605.
170. Id. at 1595. Kimura calls this interpretive model the "exclusive majoritarian" model.
171. Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Blackmun, and Kennedy.
172. Justices Scalia and Thomas did not support application of the reasonableness test, but
nevertheless agreed that TXO's due process was not violated.
173. Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, White, Marshall, and Stevens made up the simple

majority in Haslip.
174. Legitimacy, supranote 168, at 1595.
175. Id. at 1597.
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precedental authority than the incongruous opinion of the five justices in the
plurality. Depending on how "intuitively persuasive" each argument is, the
dissent may have usurped some precedental authority from the.plurality.
This seriously diminishes the value of the reasonableness standard as a
precedent. Strangely, the Court, in wrangling over which standard to
impose, may have effectively imposed no standard of review at all.
The future of the reasonableness standard is unclear. Justice White's
retirement eliminates a dissenter in TXO. However, since Justice White
supported the majority in Haslip, his retirement also means the loss of the
support he provided the majority in Haslip. Justice White may have
provided a crucial swing vote for the Stevens group in a future case
involving a less-sympathetic defendant than TXO, and more thorough state
court review.176 In deciding future cases, the Stevens group should be able
to agree on some minimal substantive due process standard favored by
Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, or Ginsberg. Until a clear majority arises on
the issue, lower courts are left to their own machinations in interpreting the
remains of Haslip.
B. An Elastic Standard
As many lower courts noted, while Haslipwas unclear on the stringency
of the proportionality rule, both the letter and the spirit of Haslip indicated

a preference for detailed judicial review of large, disproportionate punitive

176. One such case is currently pending before the Court. See Oberg v. Honda Motor Co.
851 P.2d 1084 (Or. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 751 (1994). Oregon statutes govern the
imposition of punitive damages in a way that imposes no specific guidelines for fixing the
amount of the award, and has no absolute caps on damages, but gives significantly more
guidance than that imposed on judges in West Virginia.
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 provides:
(1) In a products liability civil action, punitive damages shall not be recoverable unless it
is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the party against whom punitive damages
is sought has shown wanton disregard for the health, safety and welfare of others.
(2) During the course of trial, evidence of the defendant's ability to pay shall not be
admitted unless and until the party entitled to recover establishes a prima facie right to
recover under subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Punitive damages, if any, shall be determined and awarded based upon the following
criteria:
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant's
misconduct;
(b) The degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood;
(c) The profitability of the defendant's misconduct;
(d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
(e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and
(g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the defendant as
a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, damages awards to persons
in situations similar to the claimant's and the severity of criminal penalties to which
the defendant has been or may be subjected.
Orberg v. Honda Motor Co., 841 P.2d 517, 522 n.10 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (citing OR. REV.
STAT. § 30.925 (1991)).
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damages. In an unexpected break with precedent, Stevens' characterization
of Haslip's due process test as requiring only a "general concern" of
reasonableness "renders Haslip's promise a false one."" r Like many other
of the menagerie of vague, intuitive constitutional tests imposed by the
Supreme Court, TXO's reasonableness standard provides little guidance to
lower courts, and is highly manipulable by clever advocates, providing ample
opportunity for abuse. Such a test is "scarcely better than no guidance at
all.""I Justice O'Connor chides the plurality for "reject[ing] both
petitioner's and respondents' proffered approaches, instead selecting a
seemingly moderate course ....
17 9

But the course the plurality chooses is, in

She concludes that "[t]he plurality opinion erects
fact, no course at all."
guidepost to help other courts find their way through this
not a single
0
"I
area.
Several justices criticize the reasonableness standard. While Justice
Kennedy concurred in the judgment, he found the Stevens group's "reasonableness" requirement inadequate."81 The reasonableness test proposed by
the Stevens group, "far from imposing meaningful, law-like restraints on jury
excess, could become as fickle as the process it is designed to superintend.""s Justice Kennedy did not join with the plurality as to their analysis
of the substantive due process test, stating that while the respondent's
"rational bias" proposal was unsatisfactory, he did "not believe that the
plurality's replacement, a general focus on the 'reasonableness' of the award
is a significant improvement.""
Even though they disfavored any due process right to limits on punitive
damages, Justices Scalia and Thomas found some consolation in the
reasonableness standard. In their dissent, they seemed pleased that even if
TXO will stand for some Constitutional limits on punitive damages, the
standard is "far less detailed and restrictive than that upheld in Haslip." They
appeared to recognize the tremendous value of TXO as a precedent adverse
to due process limits. Scalia's wry delight with the reasonableness standard
is clear:
Today's reprise of Haslip, despite the widely divergent opinions it has
produced, hs not been a waste. The procedures approved here . . .
[suggest] that if the Court ever does invent new procedural requirements,
they will not deviate significantly from the traditional ones that ought to
govern. . . . [T]he Court's 'constitutional sensibilities' are far more
resistant to 'jar[ring],' than one might have imagined after Haslip....
177. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
178. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 429 U.S. 257, 281 (Brennan, J.,

concurring).

179. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2731 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 2731-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2724 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2725.
Id. at 2724-25 (citation omitted).
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[T]he Court's decision is valuable, then, in that the great majority
of due process challenges to punitive damages awards can henceforth be
disposed of simply with the observation that "this is no worse than
TXO."Is84
No worse indeed. It appears to these justices that even though TXO
preserves some due process rights to review of punitive damages, TXO may
provide the opponents of substantive due process limits on punitive damages
a powerful bulwark against any imposition of such limits.
VII. TROUBLED APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD

Lower courts will likely have difficulty in the application of the
reasonableness standard as set out in TXO. Even if the lower Courts
interpret TXO's fractured opinion as a weak precedent favoring the broad
reasonableness standard set out in Haslip, a greater problem exists in the
meaningful application of such a requirement. The Court has stated for years
that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive due process limits on
punitive damages, yet it has overturned such an award only twice in its
history, the last time being in 1915. '1 Consistent with this unimpeded
incumbency over substantive due process given the states prior to Haslip, the
states rarely have overturned jury awards of punitive damages; normally only
when they evinced passion or bias"e-vague standards in and of themselves.
The Court's seminal decisions in Banker's Life and Cas. Co. v.
Crenshaw,1" and Haslip seemed to indicate an end to these minimalist
standards of review.
Yet, the application of the due process test after TXO is no less
manipulable than are the jury-based standards. The ease with which clever
advocates can manipulate this standard is apparent even in the very case that
sets the standard. Erecting a broad, comprehensive "reasonableness" inquiry
creates, as with many other Supreme Court standards of late, a nightmare for
lower courts attempting to apply the manipulable standards. Lower courts,
looking at TO, will likely be baffled by the rickety logic applied by the
Court. As a result, courts will have no choice but to return to the comfortable, but undisciplined review processes so common before Haslip.
To understand why courts will have difficulty understanding the tests
espoused in TXO, it is instructive to examine how the circuit court applied
the rationality test. In TXO, the ten million dollar punitive award was
reasonable, the Court said, given "(1) the potential harm TXO's actions

184. Id. at 2727 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 2718. The latest case overturning a punitive damages award is Southwestern
Telegraph & Telephone Company v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
186. Games v. Fleming Landfill, 413 S.E.2d 897, 907 (W. Va. 1992) (citing Wells v.
Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1982)).
187. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
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could have caused; (2) the maliciousness of TXO's actions; and (3) the
penalty necessary to discourage TXO from undertaking such endeavors in the
future."' 8 The following three sections will examine in turn how the
Court applied each of these elements, and attempt to reveal the minimum

requirements of TXO's reasonableness standard.
A. The PotentialHarm of PotentialHarm

In Haslip, the Court enunciated the new "potential harm" factor." 9
In considering the size of a punitive award, the Court required consideration
not only of actual harm, but also the harm that is "likely" to occur from the
defendant's conduct. This rationale is a "narrow exception" in cases where
19
"the actual harm was minimal but the potential harm was tremendous."' 0
In one such case, a hospital was sued for injuries caused by a crash of its
Life Flight helicopter.191 Even though the crash killed several persons, the
crash did not cause further injury to the accident victim being transported.' 9 Tragically, the victim died only a few days later; not as a result of any
193
injuries suffered in the crash, but because of his original bum injuries.
The court held that even though the plaintiff died as a result of his original

injuries (and hence, compensatory damages were very small), the fact that
the helicopter crash could have caused serious injuries justified punitive
damages based on the harm that was likely to occur in the crash. 94
However, TXO and Jones are disanalogous for two reasons: the harm

likely to occur from the helicopter crash in Jones was, first, much more
serious in nature, and, second, much more likely to occur. The potential

188. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 889 (W. Va. 1992).
189. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21. "(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the
punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as
the harm that actually has occurred." Id.
190. Games, 413 S.E.2d at 908. The common analogy is to a man who shoots a gun
through a crowded room. Even though he may hit no one, and cause only minimal damage, his
behavior is so reckless and reprehensible that, in deciding the proper amount of punitive
damages, we can take into account the possibility that he might very well have seriously injured
or killed someone by his behavior. Hence, very high punitive damages would be in order where
only minimal actual damage exists.
191. Hospital Auth. v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1175
(1992) (compensatory damages were only $5,001, while punitive damages were $1.3 million).
In Jones, the Hospital Authority funded a helicopter transport/rescue program that responded to
emergency calls. However, in order to make this expensive program worthwhile to the hospitals
participating in the program, the Hospital Authority instituted a policy of bypassing emergency
care facilities at non-participating hospitals nearby the accident in order to transport victims to
its own hospitals. The helicopter was moving a seriously injured bum victim from a hospital
without a bum unit to a member hospital with bum victim facilities. However, the member
hospital was not the closest hospital with a bum unit that could accept the new patient. In part
because of the longer flight, on the way the helicopter crashed, killing or severely injuring
everyone aboard except the decedent. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 503.
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harm in Jones was the serious injury or loss of life likely to result from a
helicopter crash.'95 The Court properly seeks to severely punish those who
take risks with life and limb. However, in TXO the harm was at worst a big
economic loss for Alliance. 96 While it is entirely justifiable to take into
account potential harm when that harm is physical, it hardly follows that we
should accord the same level of protection to economic interests; especially
when those interests can be accounted for with compensatory damages.
The second disanalogy between TXO and Jones is that in Jones, the harm
likely to occur was serious personal injury resulting from a helicopter crash.
The fact that the crash did not seriously injure the patient is by far the
exception-even miraculous. Indeed, the crash either killed or severely
injured everyone else in the helicopter. The Court was correct in likening
Jones to the case where one shoots a gun through a crowded room but
miraculously hits no one. Even though there is no actual harm, the gunman
has done something very wrong. In Jones, since the helicopter crash and
longer flight threatened the plaintiff's safety to a much greater extent than his
injuries would indicate, clearly the defendant there should not be allowed to
escape punishment simply because his victim beat the overwhelming odds by
emerging virtually unscathed.
However, notwithstanding the opinions of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia and the United States Supreme Court, this is not the case
in TXO. In TXO, the West Virginia court asserted that "[t]he type of
fraudulent action intentionally undertaken by TXO in this case could
potentially cause millions of dollars in damages to other victims."" 9 This
is implausible for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent to claim both that
TXO could have caused tremendous damage and that TXO filed a "frivolous" lawsuit. Alliance sued TXO in state court for slander of title, a rare
defamation cause of action that requires two elements: first; a showing of
malice, and second; a resulting "diminished value" of the property in West
Virginia.' 9 In order to prove up its case against TXO, Alliance had to
establish that TXO's claim regarding a cloud in Alliance's chain of title was
"frivolous." This would establish the absence of good faith in their
declaratory judgment action to clear up the title to the Blevins Tract. '9 If
TXO could establish that it had legitimate concerns about the validity of
Alliance's title, it would be very reasonable to have sought clarification in
a declaratory proceeding. However, in ruling against TXO, the state court

195. Id.
196. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 889 (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 879.

199. Id.
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reasoned that the jury could have found malice on the part of TXO because
it recorded "a quitclaim deed which it knew to be frivolous."
The problem arises then, that if TXO's malice consisted in making a
"frivolous"' ° legal claim, then that claim must have had no basis in fact
or law. But if the claim had no basis in fact or law, then there is no reason
to suppose that Alliance suffered the necessary damages for slander of title;
that the value of the Blevins Tract was damaged "in the eyes of third parties. "I

A "frivolous" quiet title action would be very unlikely to diminish

the value of property rights to land containing millions of dollars worth
natural gas. Even if TXO's "frivolous" claim were to diminish the value in
the eyes of layperson third parties, it is very unlikely that a genuinely
frivolous claim would sway a judge trained in the law of property. Hence,
in a court of law, TXO's frivolous claim would certainly meet with failure.
The court is hoisted on its own petard; to prove actual damages, Alliance
must show that TXO had no chance of winning its lawsuit. Yet, to establish
punitive damages for potential harm, Alliance must show TXO had a good
chance of winning their suit. But this is clearly impossible. Either TXO's
claim was colorable and therefore conducted in good faith (in which case
punitive damages are inappropriate), or it was spurious and therefore no
damage resulted from "diminished value" in the eyes of third parties. If no
damage resulted from diminished value in the eyes of third parties, then
either punitive damages are inappropriate, 23 or damages should be abated
by the slim chances it had of winning the case. But the Court, in its
assessment of the reasonableness of the West Virginia court's review, makes
no effort at reconciling this contradiction.
If TXO was truly pursuing a "frivolous" lawsuit, with no valid legal
claim to support it, then their chances for winning that lawsuit were nil.
Given their slim chances for winning the lawsuit, TXO's actual threat was
not "likely," as in Jones, but much more remote. Indeed, this case is very
unlike Jones, in which the odds for serious injury (the likelihood of
sustaining injury from a devastating helicopter crash) were very high. Rather
than a gunman shooting through a crowded room, this is much more like a
gunman shooting a water pistol through a crowded room.
Nevertheless, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reasoned that
TXO's claim "could potentially cause millions of dollars in damages."'
This "potential" that the court speaks of apparently includes both the very
real possibility that a serious helicopter crash will kill someone, as well as
the very remote possibility that a party to a declaratory action may win, even
200. Id. It is important to point out that the filing of the quitclaim deed was the sine qua
non of TXO's slander of title action. TXO's misconduct in this case and at other times was
relevant, but not the gravamen of the tort.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 879.
203. Games, 413 S.E.2d 897.
204. TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 889.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993

27

California Western Law Review, Vol. 30 [1993], No. 2, Art. 7

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

with a "frivolous" claim. Under this interpretation, "potential harm" means
any possibility of harm, no matter how "remote. Moreover, the injury in
Jones was the loss of human life and limb; a consequence well worth taking
precautions against. In TXO, however, the injury was purely monetary. It
does not seem immediately obvious that these two interests ought to be
afforded the same level of protection. The Court's review, however, failed
to account for these essential differences.
B. Maliciousness
The second factor of West Virginia's Games "reasonable relationship"
test requires the court to inquire into the maliciousness of the defendant's
actions." 5 This section will examine how that inquiry was conducted, and
attempt to determine how the reasonableness standard endorsed by the Court
worked in the West Virginia court's review.
The West Virginia court's examination of the maliciousness of TXO's
actions indicates a very unreasonable review. On the issue of malice, Judge
Neely states that "we believe the jury's verdict says more than we could say
in an opinion twice this length."" The court reasoned that while TXO was
justified in purchasing the quitclaim deed, infiling it, TXO effectively said
to potential buyers, "I don't think you should buy that land. You know there
is a cloud on the title because of Mr. Signaigo's old deed." According to the
West Virginia court, TXO's malice consisted of the recording of the
quitclaim deed it had purchased from Virginia Crews that it "knew" to be
without any basis in fact. It "knew" that the deed was without any basis in
fact, according to the court, because Signaigo, a predecessor in interest to
Virginia Crews who was interested in the land only for its coal, didn't
believe he had purchased anything more than the coal rights.' 7 TXO
claimed that it was acting in good faith, only seeking to clear up the 1958
deed from Tug Fork to Signaigo that appeared ambiguous. They argued that
they purchased and filed the quitclaim deed from Signaigo's descendant in
interest, Virginia Crews, as "insurance" against anyone else attempting to
steal the deal away from them. Alliance, and ultimately the courts, found the
deed unambiguous, and TXO's claim spurious.
Despite the jury's finding, there is much evidence to support a good faith
basis for TXO's claim. The history of property law is replete with instances
of courts construing property transfers differently from what the parties
intended." 8 Signaigo's belief, alone, is not determinative of how the

205. Id. at 889 (referring to Games, 413 S.E.2d at 904-05).

206. Id. at 889.
207. Id. at 881.
208. Take, for example, the requirement that conveyances in fee simple include the words
"heirs and assigns," for the deed to be valid. The Contracts doctrine of contra proferentum
often finds contractual provisions where one of more of the parties did not so intend. The
Contracts Parole Evidence Rule looks to the plain meaning of the document irrespective of the
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courts will construe the deed, as any first year law student can attest. Given
the peculiar nature of property and contract law, TXO's concern that the
language of the deed was ambiguous was not so "frivolous," especially given
their multi-million dollar investment in this land. The Supreme Court said
as much. 9 If purchasing the deed was good insurance, it is difficult to see
how filing that deed, as a further guarantee, was not just as wise. Moreover,
since the gravamen of the slander action was the publication(by filing), and
not the purchaseof the quitclaim deed, Alliance incurred no greater damages
from the filing than they would have incurred if TXO would not have filed,
but simply purchased the deed and sued to quiet title. In a slander of title
action in West Virginia, plaintiffs may recover attorney's fees resulting from
defending spurious actions against them.210 In this case, Alliance spent
$19,000 in attorney's fees defending the declaratory judgment action, and the
jury awarded them that amount only, implying no further damage existed.2 1 However, even if TXO had not committed its "malicious act" of
filing the deed, Alliance still would have had to defend the quiet title lawsuit.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that TXO, with millions of dollars at
stake, would almost certainly have "purchased 'insurance' on their investment" by acquiring the quitclaim deed and seeking declaratory judgment.212
Since a declaratory judgment action is a reasonable way to establish title in
either of the parties, byfiling the deed TXO cost Alliance nothing.
Despite the tenuous underpinnings of the jury's finding of extreme
malice, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals refused to examine
further the motives of the jury. This is especially troubling given the fact
that there was sufficient opportunity for the jury to be swayed by inflammatory evidence of TXO's wealth. It would appear that even highly suspicious
jury awards with significant evidence of jury bias will not be overturned
under the reasonableness test, even though preventing the possibility of such
bias is relatively simple.
C. The Punitive Penalty
The third factor in West Virginia's reasonableness test is whether the
amount of the punitive award will sufficiently deter the defendant from
similar action. Punitive damages are commonly used as an economic
disincentive to causing harm to others.213 Where a company can ignore
certain costs external to its business activities, it can set the price of its goods
at a level that is cheaper than the actual costs to society-which includes

parties' intent.
209. 113 S. Ct. at 2724.
210. 7XO, 419 S.E.2d at 870-881 (W. Va. 1992).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See supra Part II.
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these external costs. Under a deterrence rationale, the amount of punitive
damages should be just high enough to deter wrongful activity. However,
when courts mete out punitive damages at a level higher than that necessary
to effectively deter harmful conduct, the punitive damages impose unnecessary costs on the company, thereby harming other, legitimate business
activity.
TXO is an oil and gas exploration company that supplies natural gas to
the market in order to satisfy an essential social need. Locating and
extracting natural gas is a costly activity that requires a huge investment, but
can provide significant profits. Given this tremendous investment, oil
companies are understandably cautious about taking chances with the
ownership of oil and gas rights. No court reviewing this case has doubted
TXO's caution in assuring that title to their new investment was without
clouds. Given this precarious enterprise, courts must be very careful not to
overdeter companies such as TXO from performing their useful and risky
function. Moreover, the court imposed this extremely high punitive damages
award because TXO pursued the highly technical quiet title action in a court
of law. Courts must also be sensitive to the message this sends to other large
institutions that have difficult legal problems that they wish to have decided
by a judicial authority. While courts certainly need to encourage settlement
of disputes, they should not do so in a way that gives smaller parties an
advantage over larger ones. Forcing TXO to run the gauntlet of a local jury
trial, and upholding the jury's verdict in the face serious evidence of bias is
an unfair advantage for smaller parties. There are better ways of leveling the
legal playing field.
There may be an appropriate level of punitive damages to deter TXO
from filing spurious claims-perhaps paying opposing counsel's attorney's
fees, or some other measure designed to deter TXO. Yet, in considering an
appropriate level of damages to impose, the West Virginia Court had no
evidence to support, and did no actual computation of the economic penalty
necessary to deter TXO. In fact, the main, almost exclusive, figure that
Alliance's counsel plead to the jury was the wealth of TXO and its parent
company, U.S. Steel. The appellate court considered no other evidence than
this in determining the penalty necessary to properly deter future defendants
from recording bogus deeds. Hence, it would seem that the post-Haslip
substantive due process test of "reasonableness" only requires courts to take
little more than a glance at the evidence below. In the characteristically
colorful words of Judge Neely, most judges "understand as well as the next
court how to imitate the intermediate appellate court of Texas in Texaco, Inc.
v. Pennzoil, Co., articulate the correct legal principle, and then perversely
fit into that principle a set of facts to which the principle obviously does not
apply. Even judges who are remarkably dim bulbs know how to mouth the
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correct legal rules with ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules' logical
consequences. ,214
VIII. PROPOSALS FOR DuE PROCESs

In order to better safeguard the fair determination of punitive damage
awards, the United States Supreme Court should revise the due process
guidelines it laid out in TXO. Specifically, the Court should modify its
guidelines for consideration of wealth, jury instructions, and potential harm.
A. Wealth
The Court should require trial bifurcation in order to determine liability
and damages separately. At the liability portion of the trial, only relevant
and otherwise admissible evidence tending to prove or disprove liability
should be allowed. Unless otherwise relevant, the Court should not allow a
jury to hear evidence of the defendant's wealth at the liability stage of the
trial. Allowing the jury to hear evidence of wealth at the liability stage could
cause a jury to become prejudiced against a wealthy defendant.215 Therefore, by disallowing wealth evidence at the liability stage of trial, a jury will
not be tempted into predicating liability on the defendant's wealth. The
proper time to hear evidence of a defendant's wealth is at the second
damages stage of the trial.
Additionally, the Court should divide the cases into two categories:
physical injury and economic injury. Where physical injury occurred to the
defendant, the Court should give significant deference to the jury award. In
physical injury cases, the Court should only increase or decrease a jury
award in clear cases of jury bias. On the other hand, however, where the
defendant suffered economic harm without any physical harm, the Court
should undertake a more stringent review of the jury award. In economic
harm cases, courts should give a jury less deference, with careful attention
to the possibility of overdeterrence. In instances where valuable economic
activity may be unduly discouraged, the Court should encourage decreasing
the punitive damages award. Alternatively, if the Court finds that the
punitive damages award is not sufficient to properly deter or punish a
defendant, the Court should increase the award. Imposing a significant fact
finding mission on a judicial entity will more efficiently and effectively
redress economic harms.

214. 413 S.E.2d at 907 (citations omitted).
215. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2729, 2736-37. The separation of the determinations of liability
and damages is analogous to the current practice in criminal law. First, in criminal law, the
defendant is found guilty or not guilty in a trial. Similarly, this parallels the liability stage in
a civil trial. Second, if the defendant is found guilty, a sentence is imposed at a later time.
This parallels the damages stage of a civil trial.
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B. Jury Instructions
The Court should require careful and accurate reading of jury instructions on the purposes of punitive damages. If thorough and accurate jury
instructions are not given, a jury may award punitive damages erroneously.
For example, the trial judge in TXO gave inexact jury instructions by saying
that in addition to punishing and deterring, punitive damages can also serve
as "additional compensation." 6 In TXO, the jury may have been invited
to provide additional compensation to the plaintiff, even though the stated
purposes of punitive damages were extracompensatory.1 7 By requiring full
and accurate jury instructions regarding punitive damages, the Court could
help reduce incorrect jury awards.
C. PotentialHarm
As set forth previously, the TXO court applied the Games criteria in
reviewing the award of punitive damages."' The Games criteria called for
the appellate judges to review the damage with an eye not only to actual
harm, but also to potential harm.2" In this sense, TXO is consistent with
Haslip, since evidence of potential harm is not given directly to the jury.'
In both cases, the potential harm factor is reserved for the exclusive use of
the reviewing courts. In reviewing the potential harm threatened by
defendants, courts focus almost exclusively on the magnitude of the harm,
with very little consideration to the probability of its occurrence."
Courts need to consider both the magnitude and imminence of the
potential harm involved. Punitive damages should only be considered where
the magnitude of the potential harm is high, or the likelihood of the potential
harm is imminent. In personal injury cases where a high magnitude of
potential harm is threatened, courts should be allowed to punish harms which
have relatively low probabilities. However, in economic injury cases where
a high magnitude of potential harm exists, courts should only allow juries to
punish harms which have somewhat higher probabilities. This way, courts
can provide deference to juries in cases involving physical injuries, while
exercising more discretion in cases regarding economic injuries.

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

7XO, 113 S. Ct. at 2736.
TXO, 419 S.E.2d at 887. See also 113 S.Ct. at 2737.
7XO, 133 S. Ct. at 2721-72.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21, 51; TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2722.
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CONCLUSION

Haslip set out the beginnings of a new era of jurisprudence in due
process limitations on punitive damages. After TXO, that brief beginning is
in jeopardy. TXO declined to define a bright-line absolute proportional cap
beyond which punitive damages may not go. However, rather than
establishing an alternative test for substantive due process, the Court has
pronounced a vague "reasonableness" test that proves intractable in the very
case that lays out the standard. The Court has also refused to provide
sufficient guidance to lower courts as to what procedures will adequately
ensure procedural due process is met. Apparently, the Court believes that
by simply showing lower courts the whip of appellate reversal, they can
ensure a full and fair due process review of high punitive damages awards.
Yet, the fractured plurality, puzzling logic, and lowered scrutiny make for
a Supreme Court precedent of questionable legal merit. In fact, the only two
justices excited about the "reasonableness" standard were the two who
unequivocally oppose any substantive due process review at all.m The
words of Justice O'Connor eloquently summarize the effect of TXO on the
punitive damages due process debate. "In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, this Court held out the promise that punitive damages awards would
receive sufficient constitutional scrutiny to restore fairness in what is rapidly
becoming an arbitrary and oppressive system. Today the Court's judgment
renders Haslip'spromise a false one."I
The Court has missed an opportunity to develop a line of legal precedent
establishing firm guidelines for imposing rationality on a system of naked,
arbitrary wealth-transfer more capricious than a lottery. Simply showing
lower courts the "whip" of a "reasonableness" review may bring about more
rhetoric in justification, but, as judge Neely noted, 4 this is no guarantee
of a more probing review. The higher level of scrutiny, and procedural
protections suggested by this note would require lower courts to engage in
a more searching inquiry into the many areas of possible jury bias, and adjust
the penalty imposed based on the most effective and efficient method of
punishment. Since the judiciary is uniquely well-equipped to administer
justice in individual cases, it should continue with the many proposed
reforms.
Colbern C. Stuart III

222. Justices Scalia and Thomas.
223. TXO, 113 S. Ct. at 2727 (citations omitted).
224. See supra note 224.
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